Constitutional Law: The Peyote Decision: A Restriction upon All Religions? by Brewer, Brett D.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 44 Number 4 
1-1-1991 
Constitutional Law: The Peyote Decision: A Restriction upon All 
Religions? 
Brett D. Brewer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brett D. Brewer, Constitutional Law: The Peyote Decision: A Restriction upon All Religions?, 44 OKLA. L. 
REV. 715 (1991), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
Constitutional Law: The Peyote Decision: A
Restriction upon All Religions?
The free exercise clause of the first amendment' protects the fundamental
right of Americans to worship as they see fit.2 This safeguard is made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.3 Over the years, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld the right to freely exercise religion
so long as it does not unduly conflict with the establishment clause of the
first amendment.
4
Traditionally, any burden imposed by state or federal government on the
free exercise clause must be justified by a compelling state interest.5 Fur-
thermore, statutes imposing such burdens must be narrowly tailored to
accomplish their goals in the least restrictive means possible.6 However, the
Court abruptly departed from this well-grounded standard in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,7 in which five of the
nine justices refused to apply the compelling interest test.
8
This note will briefly explore the development of the compelling interest
test as it relates to the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Next,
the note will analyze Smith and show that its deviation from traditional
first amendment jurisprudence was erroneous. This note will suggest that
the Court's departure might have been due to a lack of knowledge of the
Peyote Ritual, which was the subject of controversy in Smith. The note will
also compare the Peyote Ritual to various Judeo-Christian rituals. Finally,
this note will consider the implications of the Court's reasoning upon Judeo-
Christian religions.
Prior Case Law
Sherbert v. Verner
Cases prior to Smith reveal that statutes abridging an individual's freedom
of religion are to be analyzed under the compelling interest test.9 The leading
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I, cl. 2.
2. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). The majority classifies the free exercise
of religious beliefs as a fundamental right.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1963); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
5. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
6. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719.
7. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
8. Id. at 1602.
9. See generally Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). The
compelling interest test requires the government to show a sufficiently important objective in
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case in this area is Sherbert v. Verner.'0 In that case, a Seventh Day Adventist
was fired for refusing to work on Saturday (her Sabbath). She then applied
for unemployment compensation while she looked for another job. The
South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied Sherbert compen-
sation pursuant to a Florida law which denied benefits to those fired for
work related misconduct. As a result, Sherbert brought suit, claiming that
the statute denied her rights enumerated under the free exercise clause of
the first amendment."
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.' 2 The majority
reasoned that when the state restricts conduct mandated by religious beliefs
to such a degree that the law coerces adherents of a particular faith to
either conform their belief to fit the state's law or to move to a different
state that is more tolerant of religious tenets, such a statute must undergo
strict scrutiny. 3 The statute will be upheld only if two conditions are met.
First, the state must show a compelling interest served by the statute. Second,
the statute must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.14 Sherbert set
the standard by which free exercise issues have since been analyzed.
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Another important case contributing to the development of free exercise
jurisprudence is Wisconsin v. Yoder.15 That case involved a statute neutral
in application. !In other words, the statute did not facially discriminate
against religious conduct. Nevertheless, the Court held that a facially neutral
regulation may, in application, violate the constitutional mandate of gov-
ernmental neutrality if the statute unduly restricts the free exercise of
religion.'6 In Yoder, members of the Old Order Amish religion declined to
send their children to public school after they completed the eighth grade.
They believed that to do so would violate the teachings of the Amish faith
by exposing them to the ungodly philosophies of materialism, competition,
and various other worldly principles.
In addition, the Yoders sincerely believed that attendance would endanger
their own salvation and that of their children. Unfortunately for the Yoders,
Wisconsin had a compulsory school-attendance statute. The Yoders were
convicted under that statute and fined. The lower court upheld the convic-
tion, reasoning that the state's interest in creating and operating a system
order to override the challenger's competing interest. The test is well stated in the free exercise
case of Yoder: "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972).
10. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
11. Id. at 399-400.
12. Id. at 402.
13. Id. at 406-07.
14. Id. at 407.
15. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. Id. at 213.
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of education overrode the Yoders' claim.' 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
reversed."
In deciding that the statute was not a valid exercise of governmental
power, the Court concluded that the state's interest in education, though
of great importance, did not outweigh a valid free exercise claim.19 Applying
the Sherbert compelling governmental interest test, the Court determined
that the statute could not withstand constitutional muster. 2° The Court
reasoned that the state could not successfully maintain that its interest in
education outweighed the rights of the sincere religious practices of the
Amish. The scales tipped in favor of allowing the religious practice because
the survival of the Amish way of life in Wisconsin would be severely
hindered if the Amish were not granted an exception to the statute.2'
Yoder served to extend the Sherbert standard beyond the unemployment
compensation area to at least that of criminal law. Courts had consistently
used the Sherbert test in many settings, considering it an integral part of
first amendment jurisprudence.Y However, the peyote decision, discussed
below, drastically altered the course of the Court's determination of religious
freedom.
The Peyote Decision
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,23
the respondents were fired from their jobs as counselors with a drug
rehabilitation program because of work-related misconduct. They had in-
gested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ritual in their Native American
Church. They applied to petitioner, Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources, for unemployment compensation. However, their appli-
cations were denied.
As a result, the workers brought suit in Oregon state court.24 At trial,
the respondents claimed that the failure of the state to exempt religiously
inspired peyote use from an otherwise neutral statute prohibiting the use or
possession of drugs unconstitutionally deprived them of their right to freely
exercise their religion. 2 Over several years of litigation, the case worked its
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 215; see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, reh'g denied, 321 U.S.
804 (1944).
20. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
21. Id. at 235.
22. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Dole v.
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); Minker v. Baltimore Annual
Conference, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1989).
23. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
24. Id. at 1597-98.
25. The use of peyote was prohibited by schedule I of the Federal Controlled Substances
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) as amended by Oregon's State Board of
1991]
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way to the United States Supreme Court twice. 26 Various courts involved in
the decision-making process made a number of important findings.
The first time the case appeared before the United States Supreme Court,
the majority declined to address the constitutional issue because the Oregon
Supreme Court had failed to consider whether the use of peyote was actually
forbidden under the statute.2 7 After the Oregon high court held that peyote
use was not allowed under the statute, the Court again granted the writ of
certiorari.
Finally, in 1990, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional issue.
The Court held that because the statute is religion-neutral on its face and
is constitutional as applied to those who violate the act for nonreligious
reasons, no exception could be made for those whose sincere exercise of
religion is burdened by the statute.28 In so holding, the Court eschewed the
well-established compelling interest test.2 9 The Court cited several reasons
for its holding. However, each point of reasoning contains questionable
conclusions.
First, Justice Scadia, writing for the Court, reasoned that generally ap-
plicable statutes, such as the religion-neutral statute at issue in Smith, are
"one large step" from statutes aimed specifically at religious practices.30
Because of the difference between the two types of statutes, the Court
reasoned that strict scrutiny need not be applied to generally applicable
laws. 3' The Court suggested that a statute barring erection of statues used
for worship or a law preventing worshipful allegiance to a "golden calf"
would be subjected to strict scrutiny. 2 However, the Court refused to apply
the same compelling interest test to Oregon's religion-neutral statute.
33
The Court's refusal to apply the compelling interest test is difficult to
square with Sherbert. Sherbert is the seminal case in the free exercise area
because that case concerned a religion-neutral law and yet established the
precedent of applying the compelling interest test to free exercise cases.
34
Indeed, Justice O'Connor pointed out in Smith that "[o]ur free exercise
cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of
significantly burdening a religious practice." 3 5 Hence, it is quite perplexing
Pharmacy. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.005(6) (1987). It was so listed because of its hallucinogenic
effects. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597.
26. These were Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660
(1988) (Smith 1) and 13mployment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990) (herein simply cited as Smith).
27. Smith 1, 485 U.S. at 670.
28. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
29. Id. at 1602; see clso Petition for Rehearing at 2, Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213).
30. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1602.
34. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
35. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that the Court deviated so sharply from precedent in declining to apply the
compelling interest test in Smith.
Second, the Court reasoned that because the law does not prohibit a
belief but merely a religious act, it should stand.36 However, as Justice
O'Connor pointed out, the Constitution does not merely protect religious
belief, but also religious exercise. 37 Exercise encompasses not only belief,
but performance of various acts of worship as well.3" O'Connor conceded
that acts, unlike beliefs, are not beyond reproof.39 Nevertheless, prior case
law holds that religious acts may only be restricted by a compelling state
interest.4o
Third, the Court noted that it had not previously required an exception
to an otherwise constitutional state law simply because the law prohibited
religious adherents from freely exercising their religious beliefs. 41 This as-
sertion is inaccurate. Before Smith, the Court had consistently required such
an exception. The most obvious example of a case so holding is Yoder. In
Yoder, the Court held that the free exercise clause required an exemption
for the Amish to a regulation mandating compulsory attendance in the
public school until the eighth grade.42 Thus, religious freedom as protected
by the first amendment had been held to compel an exception to an otherwise
valid generally applicable state statute.
Indeed, the majority conveniently sidestepped Yoder in much of its rea-
soning. In the third major point of reasoning, the Court declined to apply
the compelling interest test outside the unemployment compensation field. 43
The Court asserted that earlier cases did not concern criminal conduct."
However, Yoder dealt with a conviction under a criminal statute - not an
unemployment compensation regulation.41 Smith deals with both a criminal
statute" and denial of unemployment compensation. 47 Therefore, the Court
should have applied the compelling interest test.
36. Id. at 1599-1600 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)). In Reynolds,
the Court upheld the conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy, which was against the
law.
37. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1607-08 (O'Connor J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136,
2148 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Security
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978) (plurality
opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
462 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732
(1986) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
41. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
42. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
43. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
44. Id. at 1598.
45. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208 ("[R]espondents were tried and convicted of violating the
compulsory-attendance law in Green County Court . .
46. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).
47. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598.
1991]
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Not only did the Court ignore the rationale in Yoder, but it also ignored
the reasoning in Sherbert. To justify a deviation from the Sherbert test, the
Court relied heavily upon such cases as Goldman v. Weinberger48 and
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabaaz.4 9 Those cases, however, are distinguishable
from Smith because both Goldman and O'Lone deal with circumstances in
which not all constitutional rights are available. Goldman concerns an armed
forces regulation, and O'Lone deals with a prison rule. In each of these
circumstances, authority is needed to maintain strict discipline and promote
uniformity.
In Goldman, a Jewish soldier wished to wear his skullcap with his military
uniform for religious reasons. Wearing such headgear indoors would have
violated an Air Force regulation. In O'Lone, prisoners desired an exception
from work requirements in order to attend Muslim worship services. In
both cases, the -Court decided not to apply Sherbert. Instead, the Court
determined that, unlike society in general, neither the armed forces nor
prisons need to foster debate or allow nonconformity." Thus, the Court
emphasized that it will exercise much greater deference when reviewing the
constitutionality of military or prison regulations than generally applicable
civil laws.52 This statement, of course, implies that Sherbert will still be
applicable in the more familiar civil setting. The Smith Court's reliance on
these cases was therefore unjustified.
The fourth justification advanced by Smith is especially suspect in light
of the fact that the Court has never addressed a statute specifically targeting
religious practices. 3 The Court stated that the few occasions in which it has
held that the free exercise clause prevents enforcement of an otherwise valid,
generally applicable law against religiously inspired activity have never con-
cerned the free exercise clause alone. Instead, they dealt with the free exercise
clause only when combined with another constitutional right or interest,
such as free speech or press.
5 4
If this statement is followed by the Court in subsequent cases, free exercise
jurisprudence will be severely affected. By requiring the combination of a
free exercise claim with another constitutional claim, this statement could
reduce the free exercise clause almost to insignificance. The Court's assertion
47. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598.
48. 475 U.S. 503 (19:6).
49. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
50. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 505 (citing Air Force Regulation 35-10 P l-6.h(2)(f) (1980)). The
regulation states in pertinent part that "[h]eadgear will not be worn ... [w]hile indoors except
by armed security police in performance of their duties.").
51. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507; O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 347. Of course, even in a prison
setting, constitutionally guaranteed rights cannot be totally denied. The proper standard for
prison rules which restrict constitutional rights is clearly stated by the Court: "When a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate p.-nological interests." Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
52. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
53. Smith, 110 U.S. at 1601.
54. Id.
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means that, under a statute not aimed narrowly at religious practices, the
free exercise clause will be irrelevant unless it is combined with other
constitutional rights.
However, those other rights are sufficient by themselves to trigger strict
scrutiny.55 If the Court is going to require this combination even when a
claim is already deemed sufficient by itself to trigger the compelling interest
test, potential plaintiffs might as well not bring their free exercise claim
before the Court. Clearly, under the reasoning of Smith, the free exercise
clause has been stripped of much of its importance.
Burden on Free Exercise Is Avoidable
The final point the Court made was that placing a burden on those
who practice a religion which is not widely held is an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government .... "156 Justice Scalia failed to
cite any precedent to support this assertion. Additionally, Justice Scalia's
statement directly contradicts the intent of the framers of the first amend-
ment. 7 This contradiction is ironic in light of the fact that Justice Scalia
is often associated with the doctrine of original understanding. 8
In fact, an examination of history reveals that the framers of the first
amendment would have thought otherwise. The very reason many of the
first colonists came to America was to escape religious persecution in
their homelands. 59 Furthermore, those early immigrants were not associ-
ated with majority religions such as the Anglican Church in England. In
Scalia's words, these immigrants exercised "religious practices not widely
engaged in." 60 Those Quakers, Pilgrims, and Puritans desired to escape
the burdens placed upon their religious freedom in their home countries. 6'
One important goal of the framers in drafting the first amendment was
to assure those members of smaller sects freedom from undue governmental
55. Rights enumerated in or fairly inferred from the Constitution are generally considered
fundamental. Statutes denying fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. See generally
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
56. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606. Contrary to Justice Scalia's statement, the freedom to
exercise religion must be guaranteed to all citizens, not merely those representing a religious
majority. As was so eloquently stated in Barnette: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943). The Supreme Court of the United States must acknowledge this fundamental truth.
57. Clearly, non-interpretivists (those who go beyond the original understanding in deter-
mining constitutional issues) would strike down the statute in Smith. This is evidenced by the
fact that the dissenters in Smith - Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall - adhere to the doctrine
of non-interpretivism. The point is that those associated with original understanding should
also find Scalia's statement puzzling.
58. See generally Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
59. Baker, Belief and Action: Limitations on the Free Exercise of Religion, in CHURCH,
STATE AND PoLITics 41, 42 (J. Hensel ed. 1981).
60. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
61. Baker, supra note 59, at 42.
1991]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
722 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:715
interference with their worship. 62 Now, the slight majority of Smith would
allow the religious persecution of native Americans.
Would Exemption Provide a Loophole for Allowing Drug Use?
One factor which influenced the Court not to require an exception for
religiously motivated peyote use may have been the fear that allowing such
an exception for pryote would open the floodgates of litigation to other
minority sects. 63 The Court might fear an outcry from factions desiring to
acquire a similar exception for marijuana, LSD, or cocaine." Some might
argue that allowing an exception for religiously inspired ingestion of peyote
would require across the board exceptions for religiously inspired use of all
drugs.6
Alternatively, opponents to an exception for peyotists may argue that
courts will determine whether to allow a given religion's request for exemp-
tion before appl3ing the proper standard if such an exception is allowed
for peyote. They submit that, if a court respects a religion, that court will
provide for an exception allowing religiously inspired use of the restricted
substance." Moreover, opponents may claim that if the religious tenets of
the minority religion involve the use of marijuana, the Court, simply because
it does not condone the use of certain drugs, would deny an exception for
those sects. 67 These arguments are flawed for three reasons.
First, unlike marijuana, LSD, and many other illicit drugs, the use of
peyote does not rep:resent a serious threat of abuse." The taste of the drug
is not pleasant. 69 A.dditionally, its effects when abused are disagreeable.
Abuse causes noxiousness, vomiting, and general illness.70
Second, allowing an exemption to the Oregon statute for religious use
of peyote would not hamper the state's interest in fighting the war on
62. Paulsen & Smith, "A,4 Luxury... We Can Not Afford": Religious Freedom After the
Peyote Case, QuAgREaY, Summer 1990, at 18, 19. According to Judge Bork, it is the duty
of a judge committed to original understanding "to discern how the framers' values, defined
in the context of the wo -ld they knew, apply to the world we know." Ollman v. Evans 750
F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring). Therefore, Scalia should
have applied the Framers' values regarding the free exercise of the Quakers, Pilgrims, and
Puritans to today's minority religions, which include the Native American Church.
63. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1621.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Oral Argument at 48, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213) [hereinafter Oral Argument]; see also W. LA BARRE, Tr PEYOTE
CULT 48 (1975). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Native American Church
considers peyote use outiide the religious ceremony to be sacreligious. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1619. Therefore, the threat of abuse by a peyotist is very low. Abuse is characterized by the
inability of the user to reduce consumption of the drug coupled with constant intoxication.
G. DAVISON & J. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 250 (1986). The religious use of peyote
presents no such threat.
69. 0. STawART, F'Y.oT RELIGION 3 (1987).
70. W. LA BARRE, sulTra note 68, at 148.
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drugs.7' Even the state admitted that in over a decade following the enact-
ment of the statute making peyote illegal, only nineteen pounds of the
substance had been seized by the DEA. 72 During this same period, some
fifteen million pounds of marijuana were intercepted by the DEA.73 Clearly,
unlike marijuana, LSD, and cocaine, peyote simply does not contribute to
the staggering problem of illegal drug trafficking in the United States.
Third, most of the sects using marijuana, cocaine, or LSD are actually
only pseudo-religions, created solely as a front to justify illegal drug use.74
In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger was careful to emphasize that the case
concerned well-established beliefs of the Old Order Amish." He pointed out
that the Amish are not "a group claiming to have recently discovered some
'progressive' or more enlightened" view.7 6 Instead, the Amish could point
to three centuries of tradition as a religious group." The religious tradition
of the Amish, Burger emphasized, is one "few other religious groups or
sects could make.
' 78
However, the Native American Church is also among these few groups.
The sacramental use of peyote represents an established part of the native
American religion. The Peyote Ritual has been in existence among native
Americans for at least three hundred years. 79 Therefore, like the Amish, the
Native American Church was not instituted in order to avoid a governmental
restriction. Instead, both churches represent sincere religious groups steeped
in tradition.
By contrast, most groups created to avoid prosecution on drug charges
are easy to recognize. For example, in United States v. Kuch,80 the defendant
desired designation of his organization as a religion primarily to be allowed
to abuse drugs as a supposed right under the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. The District of Columbia Circuit Court found that the
use of drugs, such as peyote within the Native American Church and wine
in Christian churches, cannot be construed to allow an exception which
would allow use of a habit-forming illicit drug.'
The court in Kuch further found that the church failed to show evidence
of a sincere belief in a "supreme being, a religious discipline, a ritual, or
tenets to guide one's daily existence." 82 Included in the novel "beliefs" of
the church in question was that the church's spiritual leader was known as
71. Id.
72. Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 9.
73. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. See generally Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion as Defense to Prosecution for
Narcotic or Psychedelic Drug Offense, 35 A.L.R. 3D 939 (1971 & Supp. 1989).
75. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 236.
79. 0. STEWART, supra note 69, at 18.
80. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
81. Id. at 444.
82. Id.
1991]
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Chief "Boo Hoo." 83 The group's symbol was a toad with three eyes. Its
seal contained a picture of a toad surrounded by the name of the church
and its motto: "Victory over horseshit."' Among its sacred hymns were
"Puff the Magic Dragon" and "Row, Row, Row Your Boat." Obviously,
such a faction, lacking any sincere religous belief, cannot be considered a
religion within the meaning of the religion clauses of the first amendment."5
By contrast, in Smith, it was undisputed that the adherents to the Native
American Church were sincere in their beliefs.16 This fact is significant
because in previous cases, the Court would not blindly accept the sincerity
of any group claiming immunity from a statute on free exercise grounds.
Instead, the Court would make some determination of the sincerity of the
group's religious beliefs. 7
These safeguards would adequately prevent those holding insincere and
unestablished beliefs from obtaining an exception to a drug-related statute.
Additionally, courts will uphold the state's interest in preventing drug
trafficking and will disallow an exemption for a habit-forming illicit drug.
Indeed, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Smith notes the precedent for disal-
lowing all claims for illegal drug use except those involving peyote.a
Establishment Problems
Another possible problem with requiring an exemption for religious use
of peyote is a concern that it might amount to an establishment of religion. 9
The applicable portion of the first amendment says "Congress shall make
no law respecting am establishment of religion."0 However, an exception
to Oregon's statute would not violate the establishment clause for three
reasons.
First, twenty-three other states and the federal government exempt the
religious use of peyote from the scope of statutes which make peyote use
illegal.91 Second, during Prohibition, wine used for Communion was spe-
83. Id at 443.
84. Id. at 445.
85. Id.
86. Oral Argument, .Tupra note 68, at 5. Not only was the religion a sincere one but the
respondents themselves viere earnest in their faith.
87. Such a determination was made in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). In
that case, leaders of the .1 Am movement were convicted for using the postal system to defraud
the public. They solicited funds and sought membership in their organization through fraudulent
and improper pretenses. A jury instruction in the case was at issue on appeal. It charged the
jury to determine whether the defendants "honestly and in good faith" believed the things
they professed in the literature distributed in the mail. The instruction did not ask the jury
whether they agreed with the defendants' beliefs. It merely called for good faith. The instruction
was upheld. Id. at 83-84. In this regard, sincerity of belief may be determined. See also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (examining the sincerity and tradition of the
Amish faith).
88. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1620 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 14.
90. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, cl. 1.
91. Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 5.
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cifically exempted from the prohibition statute. 92 Third, the exemption would
not violate the Lemon test, which has been used to determine whether a
statute violates the establishment clause.
The Lemon test was established in Lemon v. Kurtzman.93 The Court
handed down a three-part test which has since guided the Court's inquiry
in establishment clause cases. 94 The test provides: "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion."95
The exception sought in Smith fulfills all three prongs of the Lemon test.
First, the secular purpose of the exception is to allow continuation of the
customs and traditions of native Americans, which have existed for at least
three hundred years.9 6 Second, as will be discussed below, the primary effect
of excepting peyote from the statute no more advances religion than allowing
a similar exception for wine use for Communion during Prohibition. With-
out such an exception, peyotists would be forced to choose between not
practicing their religion according to its tenets and moving to a more tolerant
region of the country.
Finally, an exception for peyote use would not involve excessive govern-
mental entanglement of church and state. Any exception to a generally
applicable statute will unavoidably involve a limited amount of entangle-
ment. Sometimes the state must involve itself to accommodate religious
practices.97 A minimal involvement must be tolerated in order to ensure
compliance with the free exercise clause. Therefore, the exception passes all
three prongs of the Lemon test.
Similarities to Communion
Perhaps the Smith Court decided to allow this burden on the religious
exercise of Native Americans because such a religion is unfamiliar to the
Court and to most Americans. Yet many do not realize that the Native
American ritual involving the use of peyote is similar to Christian Com-
munion. Most native American religious ceremonies involve the earth and
are spatial in nature. 9 However, like Christian Communion, the Peyote
Ritual involves the consumption of an element. In the ceremony, peyote is
either eaten or drunk in the form of a tea.99
92. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1618 n.6.
93. 404 U.S. 602 (1971).
94. Id. at 612-13.
95. Id.
96. 0. STEwART, supra note 69, at 18.
97. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987).
98. See generally Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319
(1988) (Native Americans claimed that construction of a road across sacred lands violated their
free exercise rights).
99. The drug was originally used by aborigines in Mexico and south Texas, where peyote
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Many Indians who had been exposed to Christianity but still wanted to
reconcile their newfound religion with the religion of their tribal roots
enthusiastically accepted peyote.100 The Peyote Ritual allows them to cele-
brate their native religion in a manner similar to Christian sacramental
worship.' 0' In fact, many native Americans use peyote as a sacrament in a
Christian ceremony, even displaying the crucifix during the ritual. 02 Just as
the original American colonists desired to worship freely, peyote use among
American Natives represents a sincere attempt to worship God as they see
Him. Therefore, the compelling state interest test, as established in Sherbert,
should have been applied in Smith.
Rule Disadvantages Judeo-Christian Religions
Justice Scalia's basic premise in his statement that minority religions are
unavoidably discriminated against in democratic societies is erroneous. The
Smith decision disadvantages not only native American religions but Judeo-
Christian religions as well. Smith opens the door for innumerable restrictions
on religious practices as long as the legislature couches the restrictions in
generally applicable language. 03
Imagine a statute which, though neutral on its face, had the effect of
prohibiting observation of a fundamental Christian sacrament, such as
Communion, or an important Jewish ceremony, such as Passover, Such a
statute is not hard to conceive, as both ceremonies may involve the use of
alcohol. So long as the statute bars only the use of alcohol in certain settings
and does not facially mention religion, each of these fundamental religious
ceremonies could, in effect, be outlawed under the reasoning in Smith.
1
0
4
This statute could read: "No alcoholic beverage shall be served in any public
accommodation, business, facility, club, or other institution where minors
are allowed to be present at the time such beverages are being or may be
served." ' Such a statute would be legally indistinguishable from the one
in question in Smith for several reasons.
First, both statutes prevent the observation of a basic tenet of a sincerely
held and well-established belief. Communion, like the Peyote Ritual, is a
sacrament occasionally observed in accordance with the teachings of a
is indigenous. 0. STrArtT, supra note 69, at 17. Native Americans eventually using peyote
in Oklahoma included the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Southern Cheyenne, Southern Arapaho, Osage,
Quapaw, Seneca, Delaware, Ponca, Kaw, Tonkawa, Oto, Pawnee, Sac & Fox, Iowa, Kiekapoo,
and the Shawnee. Id. at 69-126. However, when these tribes were forced into what is now
Oklahoma, they brought peyote and its ceremony with them. These Native Americans shared
this aspect of their religion with the other tribes native to or recently relocated in Oklahoma.
Id. at 99.
100. 0. STEWART, supra note 69, at 97.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 115, 1356-57.
103. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 29, at 2.
104. Paulsen & Smith, supra note 62, at 18.
105. Id.
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genuine faith. Communion is a celebration of the Last Supper within the
Christian faith.'06 The ceremony is rich in symbolism and its observance is
fundamental to Christians. °7 Therefore, the hypothetical statute, without
an exception for Communion, would force Christians to either compromise
their beliefs and conform to the will of the Smith majority or move to a
different, more tolerant, state.
Similarly, an important Jewish celebration called Sederim could also be
circumscribed by the hypothetical statute108 Congregational Sederim occurs
during Passover night.109 Sederim involves the recitation of psalms,' prayers,
singing of hymns, and consumption of wine." 0 Without an exception to the
hypothetical statute, this occasion could not be celebrated in a public place.
Jews would be forced either to celebrate in their homes or flee to a region
that would not suppress their beliefs. Thus, the reasoning in Smith would
tolerate a certain amount of suppression of Judaism.
Third, though rational, neither the hypothetical statute nor the one in
Smith serves a compelling state interest in the context of religious ceremo-
nies. Neither assures the protection of life, public health, or rights of others.
The law in this area is well summarized in Yoder. There, the Court says
that only those interests of the greatest importance and those not otherwise
satisfied may outweigh valid free exercise claims."' The legitimate interests
of the state could still be served if an exemption for religious use of wine
were allowed in the hypothetical statute and a similar exception were allowed
for religious use of peyote in Smith.
Conclusion
Smith marks a sad day in the jurisprudence of the free exercise clause of
the first amendment. The outcome of Smith not only severely infringes
upon the religious freedom of minority religions like the Native American
Church, but also upon the Judeo-Christian majority. No wonder such a
diverse combination of groups ranging from the American Civil Liberties
Union to the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs signed the petition
for rehearing," 2 which, unfortunately, was denied."'
Justice Scalia wrote that "we cannot afford the luxury" of granting an
exception for the religiously-inspired use of peyote. 114 Still less, however,
can we afford sacrificing the jurisprudence and plain language of the first
amendment to the whims of the Court. How closely the Court will follow
106. Luke 22:7-38. The celebration commemorates the last time Christ dined with His
disciples.
107. For purposes of the ritual, the wine represents (or becomes, according to some denom-
inations) the blood of Christ. A. DIcKNs, THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 62-63 (1964).
108. B. CoHoN, JUDAism IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 196 (1948).
109. Id.
110. L. DEmBrrz, JEWISH SERVICE IN SYNAGOGUE AND HoM 356 (1898).
111. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
112. Daily Oklahoman, May 11, 1990, at 1.
113. 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
114. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.
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Smith in subsequent free exercise cases remains to be seen. Nonetheless,
Smith could represent the beginning of the end of the importance of the
free exercise clause of the first amendment.
D. Brett Brewer
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